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Mar 19th, 2008 by ravi
Language, means and ends »

As has become the norm these days, most of the media is agog over Obama’s Race In America speech. To his credit, the man tackled some of the controversies that led to this speech more directly than employ his usual forceful repetition of uplifting trivialities. The intent of this blog post is to ponder on the trend (in the way we talk about things) that seems to have reached its nadir in the rhetoric surrounding his campaign. I will offer two examples, at least one of which any member of the broad left will appreciate.

The first example is that incongruous claim of Fox News: that they are Fair and Balanced. It is not arguable (I hope) that even those who disagree on whether Fox can make this claim will agree that Fair and Balanced is a good goal for a news organisation. I believe that is not necessarily so. Why not instead Objective and Factual? We are aware of the valid critique of notions of objectivity and fact as offered by philosophers, post-modernists and relativists. Yet, all that suggests is that a fair and balanced approach is a good means to the end of informing the public in a critical manner of events and issues. Instead, a subtle (or perhaps not so subtle) substitution of terms occurs, where Objective is replaced by Neutral or Centred. As some have said: “Nazis and gypsies/Jews get equal time — we report, you decide!”.

Similarly, you have this class of political citizens now known as “independents” — the name denotes that these individuals are independent of political parties and (by some extension) ideologies. But where do they stand on right and wrong? After all, those who support this or that party or ideology do so (typically) not because of some arbitrary preference, but because they believe their ideology to be right or just. It should perhaps be unsurprising then that independents tend to be those who are least affected by issues of truth and justice.

A second example is the appeal, via Obama, of the term “unity”. We, the public, are “yearning for unity”, some sort of “middle path” (as one New York Times writer, Ron Klain, puts it), implying either that disunity is the primary problem facing us, or that unity can simultaneously serve as both the means and end. The real problem however is that it can be neither, exactly because it cannot be produced from thin air (or hot air, for that matter!), for the resolution of the issues of contention rightly preclude unifying behind a programme, agenda or methodology towards a common goal. We are often offered the analogy of ‘herding cats’ to highlight the problems of extreme fractiousness, and it is not an entirely invalid argument, but it is not the central problem. Feminists, labour activists, minority rights advocates, animal welfare activists and others are not acting out of a sense of feline disobedience, but rather constantly working on reconciling the righteous demands of their cause with the limits of immediate political change.

As in the case of creationism vs evolutionary theory, the divisions among political groups reflect fundamental disagreements in the way we see and project the world, how it is and how it should be. Unity cannot resolve the issues but rather the resolution of these issues can bring about unity: if the parties involved can agree upon a mechanism for resolution. And that, in my humble opinion, is the real issue. The divisions among groups remain intractable because these groups do not even share a methodology for resolving disputes. The routine fallback, in the face of this block, is the invocation of allegedly shared “values”, common roots, mythical glorious pasts, and such bromides. Which incidentally are a large part of many of Obama’s “inspiring” speeches. If you don’t believe me, here are the “greatest hits” from the Race in America speech as they appear in the first few paragraphs:

  • Obligatory introductory reference and eulogy to founding fathers
  • Unite for “our children and grandchildren” — childless need not apply!
  • “Unyielding faith in the decency and generosity of the American people”
  • “… no other country on Earth is my story even possible” (why not?)
  • “we saw how hungry the American people were for this message of unity” (this is a leap of rhetoric even for Obama, that people hunger not even for “unity” but for a “message” of unity. Jon Stewart pointed out something puzzling about George Bush’s speeches: the man would arrive at various spots facing emergencies and proclaim that he was there to reassure the people, and so on. What Stewart found strange was that Bush would tell us what he was there for, which is more or less obvious, but fail to give us a clue on how he planned to go about this task!).

Obama is possibly a more honest chap than many others in his sphere. Rather than capitalise on the Geraldine Ferraro controversy, by continuing the ongoing “framing” of her comments in a racist context (no doubt ably aided by her continued blathering), he astutely nails the crux of the criticism:

On one end of the spectrum, we’ve heard the implication that my candidacy is somehow an exercise in affirmative action; that it’s based solely on the desire of wide-eyed liberals to purchase racial reconciliation on the cheap.

In case it isn’t obvious, I don’t speak for Ferraro or her psychologist, but the above is the legitimate form of what I would like to call the “Obama as a non-threatening black man advantage” thesis. And as noted in a previous post, this is the promise offered explicitly by Obama supporters like Oprah Winfrey: “[you] are free from the constraints of gender and race”.

 
Nov 22nd, 2006 by ravi
Kremlin Minutes at Spiegel »

Spiegel Online has a series of Kremlin Minutes posted on their web site, such as this one: The Kremlin Minutes: “We Should Demolish the Wall Ourselves”.

Visit Spiegel Online for more. I am sure we won’t see much of this in US press since as Spiegel points out (last sentence):

In the fall of 1990, as Germany celebrated reunification, an enormous tragedy was taking shape in Moscow. The historical turning point can be reconstructed from previously undisclosed minutes of Politburo meetings published in Russia this month. And Mikhail Gorbachev may finally get the historical recognition he deserves.

We wouldn’t want to give up on the myth that a B-grade actor who couldn’t differentiate between his movie roles and reality was rather The Great Communicator who single-handedly brought the “cold war” to an end.

[ Link ]

 
Sep 28th, 2006 by ravi
Serving a ray of truth? »

Australian media personality Steve Irwin’s widow Terri offers this, regarding the video footage of the event that led to his death:

BBC | Irwin death film ‘will never air’

Footage of Australian naturalist Steve Irwin’s death will never be broadcast, his widow Terri has said in her first interview since his 4 September death.

“What purpose would that serve?” she asked presenter Barbara Walters in an interview with US programme 20/20.

She goes on to say:

… his death was just a “stupid” accident – “like running with a pencil”.

Well, it looks like she has answered her own question. The video would serve the purpose of establishing whether the event was similar to “running with a pencil” or to poking a pencil into your eye.

[ Link ]

 
Jan 25th, 2006 by ravi
The emperor’s new inadequacy »

In a well-reasoned piece titled:

Can humans escape Goedel?:A review of "Shadows of the Mind" by Roger Penrose

Daryl McCollough provides a non-paradoxical version of the Liar's Paradox to illustrate inconsistency in human thinking. In doing so, he addresses a particular aspect of the interpretations of belief and truth with regard to debate on Gödel's incompleteness theorem (the first, for the picky). That issue is a better understanding of human fallibility (and its relationship to the phrase "there are some sentences we know to be true"). Perhaps Wittgenstein can be interpreted to also explore this in his [in]famous commentary on Gödel's Theorem but more on that later.
McCollough writes:

6. How Could Inconsistency Creep Into Human Reasoning?

6.1 As I discussed in the last section, Penrose's arguments, if taken to their logical conclusion, show us not that the human mind is noncomputable, but that either the human mind is beyond all mathematics, or else we cannot be sure that it is consistent. If we reject the "mysterian" position that mind is beyond science, we are left with the conclusion that we can't know that we are consistent. This seems very counter-intuitive. If we are very careful, and only reason in justified steps, why can't we be certain that we are being consistent?

6.2 Let me illustrate with a thought experiment. Suppose that an experimental subject is given two buttons, marked "yes" and "no", and is asked by the experimenter to push the appropriate button in response to a series of yes-no questions. What happens if the experimenter, on a lark, asks the question "Will you push the 'no' button?". It is clear that whatever answer the subject gives will be wrong. So, if the subject is committed to answering truthfully, then he can never hit the "no" button, even though "no" would be the correct answer. There is an intrinsic incompleteness in the subject's answers, in the sense that there are questions that he cannot truthfully answer.

6.3 Now, there is no real paradox in this thought experiment. The subject knows that the answer to the experimenter's question is "no", but he cannot convey this knowledge. Thus there is a split between the public and private knowledge of the subject. But now, let's extend the thought experiment.

6.4 Someday, as science marches on, we will understand the brain well enough that we can dispense with the "yes" and "no" buttons (which are susceptible to lying on the part of the subject). Instead of these buttons, we assume that the experimenter implants probes directly into the subject's brain, and we assume that these probes are capable of directly reading the beliefs of this subject. If the probes detect that the subject's brain is in the "yes" belief state, it flashes a light labeled "yes", and if it detects a "no" belief state, it flashes a light labeled "no". Now, in this improved experiment, the subject is asked the question "Will the 'no' light flash?"

6.5 In this improved set-up, there is no possibility of the subject having knowledge that he can't convey; the probe immediately conveys any belief the subject has. If the subject believes the "no" light will flash, then the answer to the question would be "yes", and the subject's beliefs would be wrong. Therefore, if the subject's beliefs are sound then the answer to the question is "no". Therefore, since the subject cannot correctly believe the answer to be "no", he similarly cannot correctly believe that he is sound. If the subject reasons from the assumption of his own soundness, he is led into making an error.

6.6 As can be seen from this thought experiment, the inability to be certain of one's own soundness is not a deficiency of intelligence. There is no way that the subject in the experiment can correctly answer the question by just "thinking harder" about it.

And provides this conclusion:

8. Conclusion

8.1 Penrose's arguments that our reasoning can't be formalized is in some sense correct. There is no way to formalize our own reasoning and be absolutely certain that the resulting theory is sound and consistent. However, this turns out not to be a limitation on what computers or formal systems can accomplish relative to humans. Instead, it is an intrinsic limitation in our abilities to reason about our own reasoning process. To the extent that we understand our own reasoning, we can't be certain that it is sound, and to the extent that we know we are sound, we don't understand our reasoning well enough to formalize it. This limitation is not due to lack of intelligence on our part, but is inherent in any reasoning system that is capable of reasoning about itself.

I think its a refreshing angle to the old debate, one that does not get as much attention.

P.S: When talking about truth above I am hopefully not mystifying it in a way that ignores the deflationary theory of truth.

 
Jan 25th, 2006 by ravi
You might be a (mathematical) Platonist? »

[with apologies to Jeff Foxworthy]

Among other eminent bits, Karlis Podnieks has an interesting test you can use to see if you are a Platonist. As psychologists like to say, denial is more than just a river in Egypt and the first step to recovery is accepting the problem. So, take the test… its for your health! ;-)

Foundations of Mathematics. Mathematical Logic. By K.Podnieks

Suppose, someone has proved that the twin prime conjecture is unprovable in set theory. Do you believe that, still, the twin prime conjecture possesses an “objective truth value”? Imagine, you are moving along the natural number system:

0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, …

And you meet twin pairs in it from time to time: (3, 5), (5, 7), (11, 13), (17, 19), (29, 31), (41, 43), (59, 61), (71,73), … It seems there are only two possibilities:

a) We meet the last pair and after that moving forward we do not meet any twin pairs (i.e. the twin prime conjecture is false),

b) Twin pairs appear over and again (i.e. the twin prime conjecture is true).

It seems impossible to imagine a third possibility…

If you think so, you are, in fact, a Platonist.

 
Jan 10th, 2006 by ravi
L’Affaire Sokal: The lowest form of humour »

Doron Zeilberger at Rutgers publishes a page of opinions that is a wonderful read, even if you are not a mathematician. In opinion 11 he points out better than I can exactly what was wrong with Sokal’s prank on the pomo philosophers:

Opinion 11 of Doron Zeilberger:
Great Scientists, Lousy Philosophers

The intersection of the sets of great mathematicians or scientists and great philosophers is a rapidly decreasing function of time.

[...]

Nowadays, Traditional God has been replaced, in part, by another God: `Absolute Truth’. Practicing scientists get really annoyed when they are reminded that after all they are also human, and their view of science is time- and fashion- dependent. So Alan Sokal had a good laugh at the expense of post-modern cultural-relativists. But he used the same cheap trick of Euler, intimidation by jargon. He went one step farther: making fun of the sociologists’ jargon. He had the advantage that their jargon is closer to spoken English than his, so he could master it superficially.

Making fun of other people’s language is the lowest form of humor. Like Euler, Sokal did not prove anything, except that physical scientists and mathematicians are arrogant and look down on everybody else. They are also religious fanatics, for whatever religion they may have. Social science has probably lots of rubbish, but so does regular science, and in either case it is not the content that matters so much as the act of expressing oneself’s.

For more info on the Sokal Prank see the Wikipedia.

 

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