In left circles in the USA I have heard the (at times grudging, or at other times even proud) acceptance/declaration of the notion that Western Liberalism (or Western Democracy) is the better of available systems, past and present. While one part of this notion, that liberalism or democracy are positive systems, is unambiguous (and even agreeable) to me, I have been confounded by what clarification or addition is provided by the prefix “Western”.

Perhaps the simple fact that many non-Western nations have a relatively short history at democracy excludes them from contributing to the idea of it? That this short history is a consequence of the colonialism of these same Western nations is surely not unworthy of consideration in such a conclusion? Or is it? It could be argued that while the latter is a sad and deplorable truth about the double-faced advance of democracy in the West, it does not change the factual record of democratic and liberal thought and movements.

In his new book, The Argumentative Indian Sen speaks to this very issue as he tracks the history of the development of the argumentative tradition in India (one non-Western nation that gained independence from colonialism in 1947 and has, apart from a brief period of emergency, retained a democratic form of government):

From Sen’s “The Argumentative Indian” (hardcover, 2005):

Pages 12-14:

The historical roots of democracy in India are well worth
considering, if only because the connection with public
argument is often missed, through the temptation to
attribute the Indian commitment to democracy simply to
the impact of British influence […]. [I]n general, the
tradition of public reasoning is closely related to the
roots of democracy across the globe. But since India has
been especially fortunate in having a long tradition of
public arguments, with toleration of intellectual
heterodoxy, this general connection has been particularly
effective in India. When, more than half a century ago,
independent India became the first country in the
non-Western world to choose a resolutely democratic
constitution, it notonly used what it had learned
from the institutional experiences in Europe and America
(particularly Great Britain), it also drew on its own
tradition of public reasoning and argumentative
heterodoxy.

[…]

It is very important to avoid the twin pitfalls of (1)
taking democracy to be just a gift of the Western world
that India simply accepted when it became independent,
and (2) assuming that there is something unique in
Indian history that makes the country singularly suited
to democracy. The point, rather, is that democracy is
intimately connected with public discussion and
interactive reasoning. Traditions of public discussion
exist across the world, not just in the West.

[…]

Even though it is very often repeated that democracy is
a quintessentially Western idea and practice, that view is
extremely limited because of its neglect of the intimate
connections between public reasoning and the
development of democracy – a connection that has been
profoundly explored by contemporary philosophers […].

[…]

Pages 75-80:

In that large tradition, there is indeed much to be proud
of [he is talking about Indian achievements that the
expat community could take pride in –ravi], including
some ideas for which India gets far less credit than it
could plausibly expect. Consider, for example, the
tradition of public reasoning. Even though the
importance of dialogue and discussion has been
emphasized in the history of many countries in the
world, the fact that the Indian subcontinent has a
particularly strong tradition in recognizing and pursuing
a dialogic commitment is certainly worth noting,
especially in the darkening world — with violence and
terrorism — in which we live. It is indeed good to
remember that some of the earliest open public
deliberations in the world were hosted in India to
discuss different points of views, with a particularly
large meeting arranged by Ashoka in the third century
BCE. It is good to remember also that Akbar
championed — even that was four hundred years ago
— the necessity of public dialogues and backed up his
conviction by arranging actual dialogues between
members of different faiths. […]

It is at this time rather common in Western political
discussions to assume that tolerance and the use of
reason are quintessential — possibly unique —
features of “Occidental values”: for example, Samuel
Huntington has insisted that the “West was West long
before it was modern” and that the “sense of
individualism and a tradition of individual rights and
liberties” to be found in the West are “unique among
civilized societies”. Given the fair degree of ubiquity
that such perceptions have in the modern West, it is
perhaps worth noting that issues of individual rights
and liberties have figured in discussions elsewhere as
well, not least in the context of emphasizing the
importance of the individual’s right of
decision-making, for example about one’s religion.

There has been support as well as denial of such rights
in the history of both Europe and India, and it is hard
to see that the Western experience in support of these
rights is peculiarly “unique among civilized societies”.
For example, when Akbar was issuing his legal order
that “no man should be interfered with on account of
religion, and anyone is to be allowed to go over to a
religion that pleases him”, and was busy arranging
dialogues between Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Jains,
Parsees, Jews and even atheists, Giordano Bruno was
being burnt at the stake in Rome for heresy, in the
public space of Campo dei Fiori.

The quoted sections above offer only a small glimpse into Sen’s thought on the matter, but even this short bit of text makes a compelling argument against intentional or unintentional regional chauvinism (if that’s the right phrase).